# IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA MACON DIVISION

ANTONIO SEAY,

Plaintiff

VS.

NO. 5:07-CV-88 (CAR)

Warden STEVE ROBERTS, Comm'r JAMES E. DONALD, Former Warden TYDUS MEADOWS, Deputy Warden JOHN FORD, Sergeant HOLSEY, and Deputy Warden KATHY McDADE,

PROCEEDINGS UNDER 42 U.S.C. §1983 BEFORE THE U. S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Defendants

ORDER & RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff **ANTONIO SEAY**, an inmate at Washington State Prison ("WSP") in Davisboro, Georgia, has filed a *pro se* civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He has paid the initial partial filing fee of \$4.66 as ordered by this Court on March 9, 2007. The unpaid balance of \$345.34; plaintiff is obligated to pay this amount in monthly payments as described later in this order and recommendation.

#### I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court is required to review complaints filed by prisoners against a governmental entity or its employees and dismiss any portion of the complaint the Court finds: (1) is frivolous or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. An action is frivolous when the plaintiff's legal theory or factual contentions lack an arguable basis either in law or fact. *Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). In determining whether a cause of action fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, as contemplated by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court must dismiss "if as a matter of law 'it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations,' . . . without regard to whether it is based on an outlandish legal theory or on a close but ultimately unavailing one." *Neitzke*, 490 U.S. at 327 (quoting *Hishon v. King & Spalding*, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984)).

## B. General Requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 1983

In order to state a claim for relief under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements. First, the plaintiff must allege that an act or omission deprived him of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States. *See Wideman v. Shallowford Community Hosp.*, *Inc.*, 826 F.2d 1030, 1032 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1987). Second, the plaintiff must allege that the act or omission was committed by a person acting under color of state law. *Id*.

#### II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, an inmate in protective custody at WSP, alleges that on July 24, 2006, Sergeant Holsey moved plaintiff, over plaintiff's objections, into a cell with a mental health inmate (L. Jones). The following day, plaintiff advised Deputy Warden John Ford "of the situation." On that same day, plaintiff's roommate became agitated and activated the fire sprinkler in their cell, resulting in a "big gush of water" hitting plaintiff in his eyes. In the process of getting down out of his top bunk, plaintiff slipped and fell, injuring his back. Although plaintiff received six medical visits following the incident, including x-rays and an MRI scan, his back allegedly remains injured. Plaintiff also appears to allege that his informal grievances concerning the incident were not properly investigated or even answered.

Plaintiff sues the following defendants: Sergeant Holsey; James E. Donald, Commissioner, Georgia Department of Corrections; Tydus Meadows, former Warden of WSP; Steve Roberts, current Warden of WSP; John Ford, Deputy Warden of Security at WSP; and Kathy McDade, Deputy Warden of Care and Treatment at WSP. Plaintiff seeks various forms of relief, including declaratory relief, injunctive relief in the form of more physical therapy and treatment by a "qualified physician," and monetary damages.

#### III. DISCUSSION

#### A. Incident of July 25, 2006

It is well-settled that a prison official's "deliberate indifference" to a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate violates the Eighth Amendment. *Helling v. McKinney*, 509 U.S. 25 (1993); *Estelle v. Gamble*, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). Prison administrators "are under an obligation to take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates." *Hudson v. Palmer*, 468 U.S. 517, 526-527 (1984). A prison official is not liable, however, "unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." *Farmer v. Brennan*, 411 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). The known risk of injury must be "a strong likelihood, rather than a mere possibility" before a prison officer's failure to act can constitute deliberate indifference. *Edwards v. Gilbert*, 867 F.2d 1271, 1276 (11th Cir.1989).

Plaintiff apparently objects to an alleged policy of double-celling inmates at WSP. Under *Farmer*, a prison official may be found to violate the Eighth Amendment if he is aware of increased risk of violence from double-celling plaintiff. *See Jensen v. Clarke*, 94 F.3d 1191, 1198 (8th Cir.1996). Such policy alone, however, does not violate the Eighth Amendment. *Rhodes v. Chapman*, 452 U.S. 337, 347-48 (1981). Here, plaintiff only alleges that his cellmate was a mental health inmate. Plaintiff does not make any specific allegations that his cellmate was dangerous or that he faced an excessive risk to his health or safety. Furthermore, plaintiff was not injured as a result of violence directed at plaintiff, but in an accident. Although unfortunate, this accident did not result from a constitutional violation.

Although **all** defendants are properly dismissed from claims relating to the July 25<sup>th</sup> incident based on the above, the Court additionally notes that plaintiff has failed to allege that defendants Donald, Meadows, Roberts, and McDade were in any way personally involved in or had a causal connection with the above incident.

It is well-settled that "supervisory officials are not liable under § 1983 for the unconstitutional acts of their subordinates on the basis of respondent superior or vicarious liability." *Hartley v. Parnell*, 1983 F.3d 1263, 1269 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1999); *Monell v. Department of Social Services of New York*, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Accordingly, plaintiff's claims relating to the incident of July 25, 2006, must be **DISMISSED**. It is so **RECOMMENDED**.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), plaintiff may serve and file written objections to this recommendation with the District Judge to whom this case is assigned WITHIN TEN (10) DAYS after being served with a copy of this order and recommendation.

#### **B.** Grievances

The Eleventh Circuit has held that a prisoner does not have a constitutionally-protected liberty interest in an inmate grievance procedure. *Dunn v. Martin*, No. 04-03566, 2006 WL 1049403, at \* 2 (11th Cir. Apr. 21, 2006); *see also Baker v. Rexroad*, 159 Fed. Appx. 61, 62 (11th Cir. 2005). Thus, the GDOC's failure to timely resolve plaintiff's administrative appeal does not result in a violation of plaintiff's constitutional rights. Accordingly, it is **RECOMMENDED** that plaintiff's grievance claims be **DISMISSED**. Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), plaintiff may serve and file written objections to this recommendation with the District Judge to whom this case is assigned WITHIN TEN (10) DAYS after being served with a copy of this order and recommendation.

#### C. Medical Complaints

Although plaintiff names no medical personnel as defendants (and apparently seeks no damages as a result of allegedly deficient medical treatment), plaintiff does seek **injunctive relief** in the form of proper treatment for his back. The proper defendants for purposes of the injunctive relief requested by plaintiff appear to be WSP Warden Steve Roberts and perhaps Deputy Warden of Care and Treatment Kathy McDade. Because plaintiff suffers from a potentially serious medical condition, plaintiff's complaint for injunctive relief <u>only</u> shall be allowed to go forward against defendants **Roberts** and **McDade**. As this is the only claim that will be allowed to go forward, all the other defendants in this action must be **DISMISSED**. **IT IS SO RECOMMENDED**.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), plaintiff may serve and file written objections to this recommendation with the District Judge to whom this case is assigned WITHIN TEN (10) DAYS after being served with a copy of this order and recommendation.

#### **SERVICE**

Accordingly, it is **ORDERED AND DIRECTED** that service be made as provided by law only upon **WARDEN STEVE ROBERTS** and **DEPUTY WARDEN KATHY McDADE**, and that they file a **WAIVER OF REPLY**, an **ANSWER**, or such other response as may be appropriate under Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 1915, and the Prison Litigation Reform Act. It is further **ORDERED AND DIRECTED** that a copy of this order be served upon plaintiff's custodian, if any.

### **DUTY TO ADVISE OF ADDRESS CHANGE**

During the pendency of this action, each party shall at all times keep the Clerk of this court and all opposing attorneys and/or parties advised of his current address. FAILURE TO PROMPTLY ADVISE THE CLERK OF ANY CHANGE OF ADDRESS MAY RESULT IN THE DISMISSAL OF A PARTY'S PLEADINGS FILED HEREIN!

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# **DUTY TO PROSECUTE ACTION**

Plaintiff is advised that he must <u>diligently</u> prosecute his complaint or face the possibility that it will be dismissed under Rule 41(b) of the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE for failure to prosecute. Defendants are advised that they are expected to <u>diligently</u> defend all allegations made against them and to file timely dispositive motions as hereinafter directed. This matter will be set down for trial when the court determines that discovery has been completed and that all motions have been disposed of or the time for filing dispositive motions has passed.

#### FILING AND SERVICE OF MOTIONS, PLEADINGS, DISCOVERY AND CORRESPONDENCE

It is the responsibility of each party to file original motions, pleadings, and correspondence with the Clerk of court; to serve copies of <u>all</u> motions, pleadings, discovery, and correspondence (<u>including letters to the Clerk or to a judge</u>) upon opposing parties or counsel for opposing parties if they are represented; and to attach to said original motions and pleadings filed with the Clerk a **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE** indicating <u>who</u> has been served and <u>where</u> (i.e., at what address), <u>when</u> service was made, and how service was accomplished (i.e., by U. S. Mail, by personal service, etc.).

THE CLERK OF COURT WILL NOT SERVE OR FORWARD COPIES OF SUCH MOTIONS, PLEADINGS, AND CORRESPONDENCE ON BEHALF OF THE PARTIES!

#### **DISCOVERY**

PLAINTIFF SHALL NOT COMMENCE DISCOVERY UNTIL AN ANSWER OR DISPOSITIVE MOTION HAS BEEN FILED ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENDANTS FROM WHOM DISCOVERY IS SOUGHT BY THE PLAINTIFF. THE DEFENDANTS SHALL NOT COMMENCE DISCOVERY UNTIL SUCH TIME AS AN ANSWER OR DISPOSITIVE MOTION HAS BEEN FILED. Once an answer or dispositive motion has been filed, the parties are authorized to seek discovery from one another as provided in the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. The deposition of the plaintiff, a state prisoner, may be taken at any time during the time period hereinafter set out provided prior arrangements are made with his custodian.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that discovery (including depositions and interrogatories) shall be completed **WITHIN 90 DAYS** from the date of filing of an **ANSWER** or **DISPOSITIVE MOTION** by the defendant(s), unless an extension is otherwise granted by the court upon a showing of good cause therefor or a protective order is sought by the defendants and granted by the court. This **90 DAY** period shall run separately as to each plaintiff and each defendant beginning on the date of filing of each defendant's answer/dispositive motion. The scheduling of a trial herein may be advanced upon notification from the parties that no further discovery is contemplated or that discovery has been completed prior to the deadline.

DISCOVERY MATERIALS SHALL NOT BE FILED WITH THE CLERK OF COURT.

NO PARTY SHALL BE REQUIRED TO RESPOND TO ANY DISCOVERY NOT DIRECTED TO HIM OR

SERVED UPON HIM BY THE OPPOSING COUNSEL/PARTY! The undersigned incorporates herein those

parts of the Local Rules imposing the following limitations on discovery: except with written

permission of the court first obtained, INTERROGATORIES may not exceed TWENTY-FIVE (25) to

each party, REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS AND THINGS under Rule 34 of the

FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE may not exceed TEN (10) requests to each party, and

REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS under Rule 36 of the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE may not

exceed FIFTEEN (15) requests to each party. No party shall be required to respond to any such

requests which exceed these limitations.

#### REQUESTS FOR DISMISSAL AND/OR JUDGMENT

Dismissal of this action or requests for judgment will <u>not</u> be considered by the court absent the filing of a <u>SEPARATE MOTION</u> therefor accompanied by a brief/memorandum of law citing supporting authorities. DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS should be filed at the earliest time possible, but in any event no later than **THIRTY (30) DAYS** after the close of discovery unless otherwise directed by the court.

#### **DIRECTIONS TO CUSTODIAN OF PLAINTIFF**

Following the payment of the required initial partial filing fee or the waiving of the payment of same, the Warden of the institution wherein plaintiff is incarcerated, or the Sheriff of any county wherein he is held in custody, and any successor custodians, shall each month cause to be remitted to the Clerk of this court twenty percent (20%) of the preceding month's income credited to plaintiff's account at said institution until the \$350.00 filing fee has been paid in full. In accordance with provisions of the *Prison Litigation Reform Act*, plaintiff's custodian is hereby authorized to forward payments from the prisoner's account to the Clerk of Court each month until the filing fee is paid in full, provided the amount in the account exceeds \$10.00.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND DIRECTED that collection of monthly payments from plaintiff's trust fund account shall continue until the entire \$350.00 has been collected, notwithstanding the dismissal of plaintiff's lawsuit or the granting of judgment against him prior to the collection of the full filing fee.

#### PLAINTIFF'S OBLIGATION TO PAY FILING FEE

Pursuant to provisions of the *Prison Litigation Reform Act*, in the event plaintiff is hereafter released from the custody of the State of Georgia or any county thereof, he shall remain obligated to pay any balance due on the filing fee in this proceeding until said amount has been paid in full; plaintiff shall continue to remit monthly payments as required by the *Prison Litigation Reform Act*. Collection from the plaintiff of any balance due on the filing fee by any means permitted by law is hereby authorized in the event plaintiff is released from custody and fails to remit payments. In addition, plaintiff's complaint is subject to dismissal if he has the ability to make monthly payments and fails to do so.

# ELECTION TO PROCEED BEFORE THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Under **Local Rule 72**, all prisoner complaints filed under provisions of 42 U.S.C. §1983 are referred to a full-time United States Magistrate Judge for this district for consideration of all <u>pretrial</u> matters. In addition, 28 U.S.C. §636(c)(1) authorizes and empowers full-time magistrate judges to conduct any and <u>all</u> proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil matter <u>and</u> to order the entry of judgment in a case upon the <u>written consent</u> of all of the parties. Whether the parties elect to proceed before a magistrate judge or retain their right to proceed before a U. S. district judge is strictly up to the parties themselves.

After the filing of responsive pleadings by the defendants, the Clerk of court is directed to provide **ELECTION FORMS** to the parties and/or to their legal counsel, if represented. Upon <u>receipt</u> of the **ELECTION FORMS**, each party shall cause the same to be executed and returned to the Clerk's Office WITHIN FIFTEEN (15) DAYS. Counsel may execute **ELECTION FORMS** on behalf of their clients provided they have such permission from their clients. However, counsel <u>must</u> specify on the **ELECTION FORMS** on whose behalf the form is executed.

**SO ORDERED AND RECOMMENDED**, this 1<sup>st</sup> day of MAY, 2007.



CLAUDE W. HICKS, JR.

Claude W.

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

# ADDENDUM TO ORDER

# NOTICE TO ALL PARTIES

PURSUANT TO THE COURT'S ORDER REGARDING DISCOVERY SET OUT ABOVE, NO DISCOVERY SHALL BE PERMITTED IN THIS CASE UNTIL AN ANSWER OR DISPOSITIVE MOTION (e.g., MOTION TO DISMISS, MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS) HAS BEEN FILED BY THE DEFENDANT.

PURSUANT TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, DISCOVERY (DEPOSITIONS, INTERROGATORIES, REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS AND THINGS, REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS, ETC., AND RESPONSES THERETO) SHALL NOT BE FILED WITH THE CLERK OF COURT. NOTE THAT THIS IS A CHANGE IN THE PROCEDURE HERETOFORE FOLLOWED IN THIS DISTRICT.

ARE SPECIFICALLY DIRECTED TO DO SO BY THE COURT OR UNLESS FILING IS NECESSARY TO SUPPORT OR CONTEST A MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY, OBJECTION TO DISCOVERY, DISPOSITIVE MOTION, OR SIMILAR MOTION. THE CLERK IS DIRECTED TO RETURN ANY SUBMITTED DISCOVERY TO THE PARTY SUBMITTING IT UNLESS IT IS FILED PURSUANT TO AN ORDER OF THE COURT OR IN SUPPORT OF A MOTION TO COMPEL, OBJECTION TO DISCOVERY, DISPOSITIVE MOTION, OR SIMILAR MOTION.